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Abstract
The siting of public facilities, such as prisons, airports or incinerators for
hazardous wastes faces social rejection by local population. These public goods
have a private bad aspect which creates a siting problem: all communities
bene￿t from its existence, but only one (the host) bears its cost. We tackle
this inevitable asymmetry from a responsibility and equity viewpoint: the host
should not be perceived as a "victim". To realize this objective, we design a
method to share the total cost (the disutility of the host plus the construction
cost) in a way that bypasses the natural asymmetry of the problem. We also
introduce a basic incentives property which has strangely been overlooked in
the existing literature: voluntary participation.
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"You can’t park here: it’s my retreat1". The actor George Clooney has turned civic
protester in an attempt to stop the building of parking lots that he says will ruin
the peace and beauty of Lake Como (Italy). The "peace and beauty" of his nearby
lakeside villa is also mentioned. In a di￿erent context, the local residents of the small
English village of Ashtead, United Kingdom, claim that they want "No heroes in their
backyard"2: they are objecting to the conversion of a large residential property into a
family support center for relatives of wounded British service personnel. Their main
complaint was that increased noise and tra￿c would "ruin the special character and
appeal" of the private lane. Many other similar stories can be found on newspapers
around the world, and they share a common property: local opposition to a public
project.
The siting of a public facility, such as prisons, airports or incinerators for hazardous
wastes face social rejection by local population. These goods are socially necessary but
come with local externalities (noise, pollution, noxious odors...) or bear a negative
connotation. Di￿erent factors can be the cause of such rejection: the loss in the
economic value of property, perceived loss in quality of life or the fear of health e￿ects.
In economic terms, these public goods have a private bad aspect which creates a siting
problem: all communities will bene￿t from the good, but only one (the host) will bear
the cost. This asymmetry typically leads to costly procedures or ine￿cient siting.
Opposition from the public is identi￿ed by numerous studies as a major factor
explaining siting di￿culties (see Mitchell and Carson (1986), the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (2002), Minehart and Neeman (2002) or Marchetti (2005) for com-
prehensive reviews). Recently, Vajjhala and Fishbeck (2006) quantify the di￿culty
to site a locally unwanted public good (U.S Transmission line siting). Combining
di￿erent datasets based on state-level data from the United States their empirical
study shows that public opposition is the main factor explaining siting di￿culties (in
front of environmental and regulation factors). Solving this siting problem requires
that we understand the parameters which generate this self-defense behavior of sorts.
The literature calls this public rejection the NIMBY syndrome (Not In My Back-
1The Times, June 22, 2007
2http://www.yourlocalguardian.co.uk/news/epsomnews/display.var.1558300.0.0.php
2Yard). It is the result of a perceived cost for the host community higher than the
perceived bene￿t than it derives from the consumption of the public good. Without
compensation it seems di￿cult for the host to accept the noxious facility. Thus, dif-
ferent compensation schemes have been designed to overcome the issue (Kunreuther
and Kleindorfer (1986), Sullivan (1992), O’Sullivan (1993), Minehart and Neeman
(2002)...). Most of this literature consists in the design of procedures for choosing
one site among a group of alternatives and compensating the host for its local disu-
tility. The main objective is to design a procedure which is e￿cient: construction
cost and the loss in welfare to the host community should be minimized. The key
problem lies in the management of this second aspect, welfare loss is a subjective
matter which brings very little consensus. The traditional approach in the economic
literature focuses on the strategic properties of the procedures: They are all mainly
designed to make communities reveal their true cost for hosting the public good.
Then, the community with the lowest cost is chosen and is compensated in a way
which preserves the strategic properties of the method.
We question this exclusivity granted to the strategic properties of the procedures:
we take the view that redistribution is intrinsically part of the siting problem. By
reviewing four cases of waste disposal facilities in the Canadian context, Khun and
Ballard (1998) conclude that inequity perception and political dimension (beyond the
economic implications) were the main causes of the NIMBY e￿ect. Similarly, Pol et
al. (2006), adopting a social-psychological approach, review previous literature and
point out that "the outcomes and lines of argument [reviewed] present the NIMBY
issue in terms of distributive justice, inequity perception and risk attribution.". Then,
they analyze 47 environmental con￿icts in Catalonia between 1988 and 2003. They
￿nd a perceived inequity in reluctant groups similar to that in Khun and Ballard
(1998). They add that "arguing annoyances, risk, distrust in the technology or its
management, and in the decision making of politicians are ways to express this per-
ceived inequity".
Thus, inequity perception arises from the physical structure of the problem. Ef-
￿ciency asks that only one site be chosen for the public good: constructing multiple
airports, dumps or prison on a small area is certainly more costly than one for all com-
munities. This inevitable asymmetry generates the perceived inequity ("Why me?").
One cannot change the property of the problem, but one can design a cost-sharing
3method (assigning to each community a share of the total cost) to overcome rejection
by diminishing the inequity perception. We will focus on the notion of responsibility
to address this issue: communities have to pay, and the host to be compensated, just
for the aspects they are responsible for. Despite the inevitable physical asymmetry,
our goal is to level the playing ￿eld between the participants: all communities have
the same responsibilities towards the public good ex-ante (before the host is chosen),
the host should not bear more responsibilities ex-post (after it is chosen). We wish
ex-post responsibilities to be as close as possible to the ex-ante situation: enforcing
ex-post equity, through the equalization of ex-ante and ex-post responsibilities, shall
help overcome the siting problem. Naturally, the host bears a strong responsibility:
its disutility determines the total cost to be shared among the set of communities.
A standard requirement, in more classical cost-sharing literature, is that if the total
cost increases, no one should pay less than before; hence in our context, if the disu-
tility of the host is higher, no community should have a lower cost share. Thus, we
extend this responsibility to all communities and require that all be subject to that
cost monotonicity. We call this property extended cost monotonicity.
We take the view that communities are only responsible for their preferences over
the public good3. The relevant preferences for the problem at hands are twofold:
the bene￿t a community obtains from the consumption of the public good (bi for a
community i) and the disutility, di, a community i endures if it is the host of the
public good. We model these preferences as the aggregation a community’s inhabi-
tants: thus, its characteristics (or preferences) change as a result of the population
movement. In practice, several movements of population are observed once the an-
nouncement of the host is made (a point raised by Sullivan (1990) and Baumol and
Oates (1998)). Some agents (living in a non-host community) with very low disutili-
ties may move near the public good because of the lower housing prices, or because
of other advantages brought by the compensation scheme (improved public infras-
tructures...) while some agents with high disutility may move away from the host
community. This, in turn, may change the communities’ characteristics and their
3We follow here one of the traditional economic treatment of responsibility and preferences (Cite
Fleurbaey, Moulin...) and other studies on the NIMBY issue: "faced with compensatory measures,
acceptance and rejection of hazardous facilities will depend on the belief and value system of the
a￿ected community" (Pol et al. (06)).
4costs share. To ensure ex-post equity we must address this issue explicitly. To do so,
we de￿ne the following property: if population movements occur between a subset
of communities, and they su￿er from it (their aggregate cost shares increases), no
community (outside of this subset) should bene￿t from it. This solidarity property
directly translates our argument which states that no community is responsible for
the distribution of preferences. If the distribution changes, no community should
su￿er while others bene￿t because this change cannot be linked to anyone’s speci￿c
responsibility. Thus, the host, or any other community, cannot be the only one to
unfairly su￿er from population movements while others bene￿t from it. We call this
property Zero Gain Under Endogenous Grouping.
In addition to these properties, speci￿c to the siting issue, we also require two
basics properties: e￿ciency and voluntary participation. The majority of the studies
assessing the NIMBY issue only consider di, the disutility for hosting the public good.
We believe that adding a bene￿t component enhances the model in at least two ways.
First, it determines explicitly wether the public good should be constructed or not
(if the sum of the bene￿ts exceed the total cost). Second, and most importantly, it
justi￿es a bound on the cost share each community will be asked to pay. Ignoring the
bene￿ts leads to ignoring the voluntary participation of each community, which could
be very problematic for the attribution of cost shares (and the siting procedure).
It turns out that only one method meets all the above properties: we call it the
Equal Responsibility Method, it shares the cost proportionally to the bene￿ts that
each community obtains from the consumption of the public good.
2 Related Literature
The siting problem has been widely studied in economics by considering the siting of
a public bad: each community is identi￿ed by a disutility (di), then an auction-like
procedure elicits a site (the community with the lowest disutility, for e￿ciency) and
a compensation scheme is constructed: each community pays an accordingly amount.
The ￿rst paper to study the problem of siting a waste treatment facilities in
this way is Kunreuther and Kleindorfer (1986). They propose a sealed-bid auction
procedure to create an incentive for each community to reveal truthfully their costs
(disutility and technical cost for hosting the facility): each community pays its own
5bid. O’Sullivan (1993), Minehart and Neeman (2002), Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein
(2002) also propose auction mechanisms, in the same vein as Kunreuther and Klein-
dorfer, aiming for e￿ciency and truthful revelation. The traditional trade o￿ between
e￿ciency, budget balance and strategyproofness is central in these papers.
Taking a di￿erent approach, Marchetti and Serra (2004) consider the siting prob-
lem as a cooperative game. They study the standard solutions of cooperative game
theory (the Shapley value, the nucleolus and the core) with an asymmetry in the value
function: the value of the cooperation changes when the host changes. Then, they
design an experiment and test which solution is the most appealing for participants.
Saka￿ (2006) axiomatizes the properties of the proportional procedure used by
Minehart and Neeman (2002). He characterizes this method with the axioms of
core property, monotonicity, and reallocation-proofness. The core property is an
axiom which implies individual rationality and e￿ciency, monotonicity states that
a community generating more wastes should pay more, and reallocation-proofness
states that no coalition of communities should gain by strategically transferring their
wastes among the group through side-payments. This property is similar to the No-
Merging and Splitting property of the proportional method in the rationing model
(see Moulin (2004)). He found the same kind of results than Minehart and Neeman:
the procedure is not perfectly strategy-proof, but all deviations are still in the core,
making it desirable for each community and coalitions.
In a companion paper, Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux (2007) design a simple mech-
anism to choose an e￿cient site which allows the implementation of any reasonable re-
distribution scheme. The unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this mechanism
coincides with truthtelling, is e￿cient, budget-balanced and is immune to coalitional
deviations. Thus, it allows to choose a site and to share the cost in a predetermined
way so as to achieve normative goals (such as the desirable properties we propose
here).
63 The model and the desirable properties of the Equal
Responsibility Method
Let N = f1;:::;ng be the set of communities. Each community i = 1;::::n obtains a
bene￿t, bi, from the consumption of the public good and endures a disutility, di, if it
is the host of the public good. Let b = (bi)i²N be the pro￿le of bene￿ts and d = (di)i²N
be the disutility pro￿le. We consider that the cost of construction of the public good
is a constant added to the disutility of all communities.
The set of communities jointly determines a decision function a : RN
+£RN
+ 7! N[;
within the ￿nite set A. This decision, determined by the pro￿le (b;d), relates to the
construction, or not, of the public good and to the choice of a host ("1" if the host is
community 1, "2" if the host is community 2... and ; if not built). The communities
share the cost of the public good (if it is built). The total cost to be shared is equal
to the disutility of the host of the public good. For e￿ciency, the community with
the lowest disutility should be chosen to be the host. A cost-sharing method assigns
a vector of nonnegative cost-shares x(b;d) 2 RN
+ such that
P
N xi(b;d) = mini(di).
Without loss of generality we rank communities from lowest to highest disutilities::
d1 · d2 · :::: · dn. Thus a decision a is e￿cient if: when
P
N bi ¸ d1, a(b;d) = 1,
else, a(b;d) = 0. We consider from now on only the set of e￿cient solutions, so
community 1 will be referred to as the host of the public good and the total cost to
be shared will be d1. Moreover, we only consider the case a(b;d) = 1 (the public good
is constructed).
To overcome the natural asymmetry of the problem (one community which bears
the cost for the bene￿ts of all) we de￿ne some properties for the cost sharing method
which aim to level the responsibilities among communities. The ￿rst set of properties
are standard fares in the distributive justice literature. The objective is to insure
basic fairness (and incentive-compatibility) of the cost sharing method. Then, we
add two speci￿c properties, relevant for the speci￿city of the siting problem.
The ￿rst property is a basic incentives property which has been strangely over-
looked in the existing literature: voluntary participation (communities should not pay
more than the bene￿ts they obtain from the consumption of the public good). The
basic assumption made by the authors of previous papers is that the stand alone of
each community is to be the host of a public good. We consider here that the public
7good brings some bene￿ts to the communities and, consequently, that the stand alone
of each communities is to agree to have the public good sited on its territory only if
the bene￿ts it obtains is superior to the disutility it endures. Moreover, if we want
our solution to be stable (no community loses by participating to the procedure) we
have to require that no community pays more than the bene￿ts it obtains from the
consumption of the public good.
Voluntary Participation (VP): For all b;d;i, xi(b;d) · bi.
The second property translates our statement that communities are responsible
for their own preferences. It states that if a community is in a pro￿le in which it
obtains higher bene￿ts from the consumption of the public good, all else equal, then
it could not obtain a lower cost share.




The same argument, valid for the disutility (if a community is in a pro￿le in which
it has a higher disutility, all else equal, then it could not obtain a lower cost share),
is implied by the following property. This property is more speci￿c to the siting
problem. The host naturally bears a strong responsibility: its disutility determines
the total cost to be shared among the set of communities. A standard requirement,
named cost monotonicity, states that no community should pay less if the total cost
(the disutility of the host) is higher. Because the solution should not treat the host
asymmetrically, Extended Cost Monotonicity extends the responsibility of the host
community to the collectivity. It states that each community should be equally re-
sponsible for its disutility and all communities are subject to cost monotonicity.
Extended Cost Monotonicity (ECM): For all d ¿ d0, i and j, xj(b;(d0
i;d¡i)) ¸
xj(b;d)
The last property we introduce imposes a solidarity between communities when
population movements occur. It states that if communities su￿er (i.e. they obtain
8a higher total cost share), then no other community should bene￿t. This property
directly translates our argument which states that no community is responsible for
the distribution of preferences. If the distribution changes, then no community should
su￿er from it while others bene￿t from it, because this change could not be linked to
anyone’s speci￿c responsibility.
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4 The Equal Responsibility Method
Let bN =
P





Theorem: Given n ¸ 3, the Equal Responsibility Method is the only method
which meets Voluntary Participation, Monotonicity in b, Extended Cost Monotonic-
ity and Zero Gain Under Endogenous Grouping.
Proof: See Appendix.
An intuitive way to split cost, the constrained egalitarian method (where the
total cost is equally split among communities, taking into account the voluntary
participation constraint) fails to pass the ZGUEG property. Indeed, when population
movement occurs, it is possible for certain communities to bene￿t from the change in
9distribution while the a￿ected communities will su￿er from it: a movement from an
unconstrained community which gives a higher bene￿ts to a constrained community,
everything else equal, will make their aggregate cost share higher and other will bene￿t
from it. Also, the proportional sharing of the total cost with respect to disutilities
(the di) obviously fails the extended cost monotonicity property: the host still bears
a higher responsibility, and may reject the public facility.
The planner interested in the implementation of the Equal Responsibility Method
must obtain some information on b, the pro￿le of bene￿ts, and d, the pro￿le of
disutilities. In a companion paper, Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux (2007) present a
mechanism which permits to select an e￿cient host, while allowing any redistribution
schemes to be implemented. This paper also presents a procedure, inspired by the
one of Jackson and Moulin (1992), which permits to obtain the pro￿le of bene￿ts as
well. This procedure allows the implementation of the Equal Responsibility Method.
5 Conclusion
We presented a simple solution for solving the siting problem. The objective was to
site the public good and share its cost in a way that minimized the chance of rejection.
Our aim was to capture the speci￿city of the problem (one community which bears
the cost, bene￿ts accrue to all) and overcome it by an appropriate method. The
traditional economic literature focuses on the strategic properties of the procedure
that elicit and compensate the host. By arguing that inequity perception is central
in the siting problem, we preferred to focus on the distributive justice properties of
the method: the aim was mainly to overcome the natural asymmetry, the host should
no longer be perceived as a "victim". Thus, we designed a method which level the
playing ￿eld among the communities. We de￿ned some natural desirable properties
and found that only one cost sharing method meets all of this property: the Equal
Responsibility Method. We feel that the uniqueness and the simplicity of the solution
are signi￿cant advantages for a concrete application.
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12A Proof of Theorem
Let x be a cost sharing method which meets Voluntary Participation, Extended Cost
Monotonicity and Zero Gain Under Endogenous Grouping.
Step 1: Take a pro￿le (b;d). Let d0 be such that d0
1 = d0
2 = ::: = d0
n = d1. Then,
by ECM no cost share with this pro￿le (b;d0) should be higher than with the pro￿le
(b;d): xi(b;d) ¸ xi(b;d0) 8i 2 N. By budget balance the cost shares actually have to
be the same in the pro￿le (b;d) and (b;d0):
x(b;d) = x(b;d
0) for all b;d and d
0 s:t: d
0
1 = d1: (2)
The cost shares of each agent is only determined by the pro￿le b and the total
cost d1. From know on we will slightly abuse notation and write x(b;d1) instead of
x(b;d).
Step 2: We now show that, by ZGUEG and budget balance, the cost share of an
agent i is determined by bi,
P
j6=i bj and d1. Consider the case of n communities:
x1(b;d1) + ::: + xi(b;d1) + ::: + xn(b;d1) = d1 (3)
Now, let b0 be such that b0
i = bi and b0
Nni = bNni. By ZGUEG agent i should




Nni xj(b;d1) (or a lower cost
share if the sum in the "prime" pro￿le is higher than in the original pro￿le). By
budget balance
P
Nni xj(b0;d1) actually must be equal to
P
Nni xj(b;d1), which implies
xi(b0;d1) = xi(b;d1). So, xi(b;d1) depends only upon bi;
P
j6=i bj and d1 for all i 2 N.
Step 3: Following Step 2, the n communities case can be rewritten:
x1(b1;bN;d1) + ::: + xi(bi;bN;d1) + xj(bj;bN;d1) + ::: + xn(bn;bN;d1) = d1 (4)
Let i;j 2 N and b0 be such that b0
i = bi + bj, b0
j = 0 and b0
k = bk 8 k 6= i;j. We
know, by Step 2, that xi(b0
i;bN;d1)+xj(b0
j;bN;d1) = xi(bi;bN;d1)+xj(bj;bN;d1). By
VP, xj(b0
j;b0
N;d1) = 0. Thus:
xi((bi + bj);bN;d1) = xi(bi;bN;d1) + xj(bj;bN;d1): (5)
13Given d1 and bN, the cost share of each community i is only determined by its bi.
Again, we slightly abuse notations and rewrite equation (5):
xi((bi + bj)) = xi(bi) + xj(bj): (6)
Which holds for all bi;bj such that bi 2 (0;bN), bj 2 (0;bN) and (bi+bj) 2 (0;bN).
Now, let b00 be such that b00
j = bi+bj, b00
i = 0 and b0
k = bk 8 k 6= i;j. Then we could
apply the same argument and found that:
xj((bi + bj)) = xi(bi) + xj(bj): (7)
holds for all bi;bj such that bi 2 (0;bN), bj 2 (0;bN) and (bi + bj) 2 (0;bN). We
could conclude that:
xj ´ xi on (0;bN) 8 i;j: (8)
By combining this result, equation (5) and equation (7) we obtain:
xi((bi + bj)) = xi(bi) + xi(bj): (9)
Which is a Cauchy functional equation.
Step 5: We have to prove that the general solution of such a functional equation
is a linear function. We will follow the proof presented in AczØl (1966). De￿ne
F : [0;bN] ! R+. Let F(z) = x(bi) and F(y) = x(bj). Then we saw that:
F(z + y) = F(z) + F(y) (10)
is valid for those z; y which satisfy 0 · h · bN, 0 · y · bN and 0 · z + y · bN.
Then, by induction:
F(z1 + ::: + zn) = F(z1) + ::: + F(zn) (11)
By setting z1 = z2 = ::: = zn it follows that
F(nz) = nF(z) (12)
14is valid for nz 2 [0;bN]. In particular for z = bN=n:
F(bN) = nF(bN=n) (13)





which implies, by (12)





for m · n, so
F(z) = ¸h (16)
holds for rational points in the interval (0;bN].
We now have to prove that this is the case for all real h in our domain. By b-Mon4
F(z + y) ¸ F(z) (17)
Let frkg be an increasing and fRkg be a decreasing sequence of rational numbers
converging towards z. Then we have for each k:
rk < z < Rk (18)
and,
F(rk) · F(z) · F(Rk) (19)
that is,
¸rk · F(z) · ¸Rk (20)
from which it immediately follows
4Formally, b-mon is unnecessary for the proof, it is implied by VP and the additive form of F(:).
However, this property is desirable in our context, we use it explicitely.
15F(z) = ¸z (21)
for all z in our domain, which was to be proved.
Step 6: We have to prove, to conclude the proof, that ¸ =
d1
bN: We know that:
x(bi) = ¸bi (22)
and,
x(b1) + x(b2) + ::: + x(bn) = d1 (23)
and also,











Which is the Equal Responsibility Method.
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